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A Framework for the Emotional Psychology of Group Membership 
 
By Taylor Davis and Daniel Kelly1 
 
Abstract: The vast literature on negative treatment of outgroups and favoritism toward ingroups provides many 
local insights but is largely fragmented, lacking an overarching framework that might provide a unified overview 
and guide conceptual integration. As a result, it remains unclear where different local perspectives conflict, how 
they may reinforce one another, and where they leave gaps in our knowledge of the phenomena. Our aim is to 
start constructing a framework to help remedy this situation. We first identify a few key ideas for creating a 
theoretical roadmap for this complex territory, namely the principles of etiological functionalism and the dual 
inheritance theory of human evolution. We show how a “molecular” approach to emotions fits into this picture, 
and use it to illuminate emotions that shape intergroup relations. Finally, we weave the pieces together into the 
beginnings of a systematic taxonomy of the emotions involved in social interactions, both hostile and friendly. 
While it is but a start, we have developed the argument in a way that illustrates how the foundational principles 





Research on negative treatment of outgroups and favoritism toward ingroups is rich and 
voluminous, and can be bewildering. Prominent theories in this domain, however, focus on different 
aspects of this complex subject matter, and often do so using different concepts and methods. We 
will argue that as a result of this, it is hard to tell when these theories actually conflict, when they 
simply address different phenomena, and when they describe and explain the same phenomena in 
different vocabulary. It is thus difficult to discern the scope and limits of our current theoretical 
coverage of this domain. 
In response, we suggest a back-to-basics approach to help systematize what is known and to 
help point the way forward. Rather than trying to comprehensively review the extant literatures, we 
begin by identifying certain fundamental principles of psychological explanation, and showing how 
they inform a certain approach to emotions. More specifically, we adopt a “molecular” view of 
emotions, and explain how it fits with the principles of etiological functionalism. We then use this 
perspective to assess several prominent theories of outgroup negativity, showing how they might sit 
with respsect to each other.  
In the process, we single out one account for special attention. This account, based on the 
idea of a behavioral immune system, overlaps with ours, but also remains incomplete in an instructive 
 
1 Many thanks to Michael Brownstein, Alex Madva, Uwe Peters, and an anonymous reviewer for generous and useful 
comments on drafts of this paper.  
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way: it fails to countenance the role of cultural evolution in the relevant etiologies. Accordingly, we 
introduce dual inheritance theory into the discussion (Richerson and Boyd 2005; Henrich 2016), and 
incorporate the ideas developed in previous sections into the larger framework it offers for the study 
of human evolution. The paper culminates in a first pass at a taxonomy that systematizes central 
components of the psychology of group membership, and that is pluralistic, conceptually 
parsimonious, and open ended. It is pluralistic in that it includes a wide range of disparate 
psychological mechanisms, but parsimonious in that these mechanisms are all identified on the basis 
of the same few theoretical principles. Completing the taxonomy falls beyond the scope of this 
paper, so our primary aim is to begin this project, and to illustrate the principles that can be used to 
extend it.  
 
II. Background: Etiological Functionalism and Emotional Molecularism 
 
The psychology of group membership is a motley patchwork of psychological processes, 
cobbled together over the course of our species’ unique and complex evolutionary history. Humans 
have quite recently (by evolutionary standards) become by far the most cultural species of primate, 
developing hypertrophied capacities for social learning that enable us to achieve unprecedented 
heights of cooperation (Boyd and Richerson 2009; Chudek and Henrich 2011; Mathew and Perreault 
2015). However, these advanced forms of sociality have a dark side, as sophisticated cooperation 
within groups gives rise to new and heightened forms of conflict between groups. As we will show, 
culturally inherited norms, institutions, and ideologies have become a common source of intergroup 
friction even in the absence of direct competition for material resources. The modern human mind 
reflects this history, containing cognitive and motivational capacities that evolved at very different 
times to perform very different functions, and which are inherited via both genetic and cultural 
pathways. 
In order to gain an overview of this motley patchwork, we begin with a familiar functional 
distinction between cognition and motivation. By cognition we have in mind representations, as well 
as the inferences that take us from one representation to another. For example: representations 
involved in the classification of individuals as belonging to certain groups, representations of 
stereotypes that apply to that group, and inferences about how individuals are likely to behave that 
follow from such classifications and stereotypes. We take motivation, by contrast, to capture non-
cognitive, often affective psychological processes which yield behavioral tendencies of approach and 
avoidance. We assume that cognitive capacities and motivational capacities interact constantly in 
complex and dynamic ways, and that appeals to both are indispensable. However, we argue that 
motivations have a special role in organizing the phenomena of group psychology.  
Another basic feature of our account will be a general conception of psychological 
explanation that we refer to as etiological functionalism. According to this doctrine, also discussed as 
“homuncular functionalism” (Lycan 1981, 1995, following Dennett 1978) and “functional analysis” 
(Cummins (1975; 1983; 2000), psychological explanations ideally begin by individuating behavioral 
capacities, or identifying distinct abilities in terms their functions—what they are for. Explanation 
then proceeds by construing the performance of functions in a hierarchical fashion, such that more 
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complex functions are analyzed into component parts which are ascribed their own, simpler 
functions, each of which is in turn further analyzed into its own component parts with their own 
functions, and so on. What makes this kind of hierarachical analysis etiological, however, is a further 
commitment to a specific way of identifying and individuating functions.  
As the name suggests, etiological functionalism is backwards looking. More specifically, it 
holds that what a given psychological capacity is for—its function—is whatever it has been selected for 
in the past. Put differently, the functions of psychological traits are determined by their histories of 
evolutionary selection (Wright 1976; Millikan 1984; Dennett 1988; Griffiths 1993). Importantly, 
however, we interpret the concept of selection broadly, to include more than just selection acting on 
genetically inherited traits. Selection acting on culturally inherited traits also plays an enormous role 
in human evolution, and as we will argue, cultural traits loom large in the psychology of group 
membership. 
This etiologically functionalistic perspective also reinforces the need to distinguish between 
cognition and motivation. For example, a lamentably common form of outgroup hostility results 
from interactions between motivations of fear, on one hand, and the cognition of racial stereotyping, 
on the other. Yet the selection pressures that produced the fear system stretch much deeper into our 
phylogenetic past than those that produced racial stereotypes. Indeed, selection pressures of the sort 
that formed the human fear system were already present in the environment of our fish and reptile 
ancestors, hundreds of millions of years before humans evolved (Panksepp and Biven 2012), and 
thus long before representations of distinct human races even existed. Appreciating this fact focuses 
questions on the kinds of selection pressures that have, more recently, forged an evolutionarily novel 
(and probably klugy, see Markus 2007) connection between fear and racial stereotypes (see Machery 
and Faucher 2005, Kelly et al. 2010). 
The distinction between cognition and motivation also underpins the “molecular” approach to 
emotions we adopt. The literature on emotions is also vast, and while it is not our aim to develop a 
new theory of emotion, it will help to articulate how a molecular view confortably fits with the 
principles of etiological functionalism.  
We understand emotions as complex functional systems composed of more basic “elements,” 
having both motivational and cognitive elements as component parts.2 Thus, each distinct 
combination of motivational and cognitive elements—each distinct molecule—constitutes a distinct 
emotion. This approach falls squarely within what Scarantino (2016) calls the motivational tradition of 
theories of emotion, which he contrasts with the feeling tradition or the evaluation tradition. Unlike 
theories in the feeling tradition, our molecular approach is not primarily concerned with the 
phenomenological, qualitative experiences that accompany various physiological states. Rather, it 
identifies emotions by reference to clusters of psychological processes, regardless of what kinds of 
feelings those processes contribute to first person, subjective experience. In this sense, our 
molecular view has more in common with theories in the evaluation tradition. However, while our 
 
2 For other recent approaches that are similarly self-consciously “molecular,” seeing complex psychological states and 
processes as being composed of simpler, more elemental ones, see Curry et al. (ms) on morality and Sripada (2020) on 
self-control.  
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view countenances an important role for the cognitive processes of evaluation, appraisal, and 
categorization, it gives pride of place to the motivational elements of emotional molecules.3  
In ordinary usage, emotion terms such as “fear,” “anger,” or “disgust” often pick out 
motivational elements by themselves. Both fear of predators and fear of public speaking qualify as 
fear. They are both subtypes within the fear “genre,” in virtue of sharing a motivational core that 
originally evolved from selection for avoiding predators. However, they are also importantly 
different psychological states, in virtue of cognitive elements they do not share. These include 
different representations and inferences serving as inputs, or triggers, for the fear system, as well as 
different representations and inferences produced as outputs from the fear system, which channel 
fear motivation into very different forms of behavior. The molecular approach to emotions 
preserves the intuitive, ordinary-language practice of classifying emotions primarily on the basis of 
motivational elements—at the genre level—but can also distinguish subtypes within those genres in 
virtue of their distinct cognitive elements. Thus, fear of bodily harm from a predator and fear of 
embarrassment from public speaking fall in the same genre because they share a motivational core, 
but since their associated cognitive elements are different, they are distinct emotions, distinguishable 
“fear molecules”. 
The molecular view of emotions is not an analysis of the folk concept of emotion, or a 
description of how emotion terms are used in the vernacular. Rather, it is theoretically oriented, and 
free to part ways with folk concepts of emotion when doing so serves the explanatory and predictive 
aims of psychologists and other empirical theorists. In this case, however, the systematizing goals of 
science appear to be well served by the folk intuition that motivation is taxonomically primary and 
cognition secondary. The number of distinct motivational elements is relatively small compared to 
the number of cognitive elements that may be combined with them. Thus, we will identify the 
principal genres of emotion (e.g. fear, disgust, anger) by appeal to motivational functions, reserving 
cognitive functions to draw more fine-grained distinctions within these genres.4 
Bringing together etiological functionalism with this molecular view of emotions yields a 
two-step procedure for organizing the psychology of negative treatment of outgroups and favoritism 
toward ingroups. First, we identify a range of basic motivational capacities involved, in virtue of the 
selection histories that produced them. Second, we construct a more high-resolution map of this 
domain by identifying various distinct cognitive elements that work in conjunction with those 
motivational capacities, again by appeal to the selection histories that forged functional connections 
between the relevant motivational and cognitive elements. We can even sloganize the main idea of 
our approach to identifying molecules of emotion: follow the selection histories. The rest of the paper 
spells out what this slogan means in technical terms.  
 
3 Within the motivational tradition, the view of emotions most closely aligned with our molecular approach is 
Scarantino’s New Basic Emotions Theory (2015). 
4 Note that nothing in this picture limits emotions to only involving a single motivation. For example, researchers 
studying “empty nest syndrome” might identify a distinct emotion capturing the combination of affectively positive 
pride and affectively negative loss (along with the associated cognitive processes) that parents experience when their 
children leave home. Likewise, researchers studying those who provide care for elderly relatives might identify a distinct 
emotion capturing the combination of grief, relief, and guilt about feeling relief that often occurs when a person they’ve 
been caring for passes away. Other kinds of complex, “mixed” or “bittersweet” emotions, might be similarly construed 
as containing multiple motivational and cognitive components. 
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III. Prominent Accounts of Outgroup Negativity 
 
A thoroughgoing review of the existing literature on outgroup negativity would extend beyond 
the scope of this article, but a brief comparison of some prominent landmarks will be sufficient to 
illustrate the difficulties of theoretical coverage and conceptual integration we hope to ameliorate.  
For example, Dovidio and Gaertner (2000) identify what they call aversive racism, in which 
individuals who are “averse” to racism nevertheless harbor implicit racist attitudes. Alternatively, 
Plant and Devine (1998) separate “internal and external motivations to respond without prejudice,” 
noting that personally rejecting prejudice is different from merely seeking to avoid punishment and 
gain approval from others who reject prejudice. Elsewhere, Fiske and colleagues (Fiske et al. 2002, 
also see Abele et al. 2020) propose the Stereotype Content Model, which posits a two-dimensional 
space defined by stereotypes of warmth and competence, yielding four emotions toward outgroups: 
admiration toward groups stereotyped as high in both warmth and competence, envy toward groups 
seen as high in competence but low in warmth, pity toward groups seen as high in warmth but low in 
competence, and contempt toward groups seen as low in both warmth and competence. Finally, 
Intergroup Emotions Theory (Devos et al. 2002) attempts to combine appraisal theories of emotion 
(Smith and Ellsworth 1985) with self-categorization theory (Turner 1985), yielding a single theory 
that identifies intergroup emotions as appraisals of situations in which outgroups affect the goals 
and interests of the agent’s ingroup. 
Each of these four accounts offers a valuable local perspective, capturing certain important 
aspects of outgroup negativity. But none provides—or, to be fair, aspires to provide—a 
comprehensive account of the entire domain. Nor do any provide a principled way of identifying the 
specific subdomain it addresses within the larger, shared domain. Moreover, each account employs 
its own basic set of concepts and methods, developed in isolation from the other accounts, which in 
turn leaves it unclear how the different accounts relate to one another. For example, one might 
wonder whether the posited “internal motivations to respond without prejudice” are the same as the 
motivations that make individuals “averse” to racism, or if not, how the two types of motivations 
compare and contrast. One might also want to know what kind of emotion occurs when one’s 
stereotypes of a specific outgroup yield admiration, but one’s appraisal of a specific situation is that the 
same outgroup is interfering with the goals of one’s ingroup. The theories themselves offer little 
guidance. Indeed, it may be the case that some of them are alternative and incompatible accounts of 
the same explanatory target, while others have different explanatory targets, and so are not in 
competition with each other at all. But even where the theories do not compete or conflict, it is an 
open question whether, or how, they could be integrated into a single, logically coherent account of 
the overarching subject matter of the psychology of group membership. The brute differences 
between them leave would-be unifiers with a patchy, incomplete understanding of the subject 
matter, and no conceptual means for identifying where the gaps in our knowledge lie. 
A fifth theory, based on the notion of a behavioral immune system, points to a way forward. 
We will argue that this theory is also incomplete, but it provides a promising basis on which to build 
something more comprehensive. Its central idea is that alongside a physiological immune system 
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that attacks pathogens after they have already entered the body, many animals are also equipped with 
a behavioral immune system that is oriented toward preemption, employing a suite of psychological 
adaptations for avoiding contact with pathogens in the first place (Schaller 2011). Two more ideas 
establish the connection to outgroup avoidance. First, an important component of the behavioral 
immune system is disgust. Second, an especially potent vector of disease transmission is other 
people, especially strangers from other groups (Kelly 2011, Curtis 2013).  
This theory predicts, and has found evidence for, reliable connections between disgust 
sensitivity and attitudes toward outgroups.5 Humans live in groups, and members of the same group 
interact much more with each other than with people from other groups. As a result, the 
physiological immune systems of individuals from the same group develop together, producing 
antibodies for those diseases to which they are collectively exposed. Ingroup members thus come to 
have the same immuno-strengths and, more importantly, immuno-weakness. Thus, for any given 
individual, people from other groups are much more likely to carry diseases to which that 
individual’s physiological immune system has no response (Faulkner et al. 2004; Navarrete and 
Fessler 2006; Navarrete, Fessler, and Eng 2007). To protect against this kind of threat, the 
preemptively-oriented behavioral immune system combines the motivational element of disgust with 
cognitive elements involving representations of members of foreign groups.  
Schaller and Neuberg (2012), who defend this theory, also claim that it fits comfortably 
within Cottrell and Neuberg’s (2005) more general sociofunctional theory of prejudice. This account 
holds that different forms of prejudice result from different adaptive threats, and since infection 
from outgroup members constitutes a serious adaptive threat, the behavioral immune system can be 
identified as one important source of prejudice.  
We endorse this (and many other) use(s) of evolutionary theory in the psychological and 
behavioral sciences (e.g., Muthukrishna and Henrich 2019). We also applaud Schaller and Neuberg 
(2012) for leveraging the evolutionary reasoning that animates their view to help situate it within a 
broader theoretical landscape. They thus make significant progress on the problems of theoretical 
coverage and conceptual integration mentioned above. However, this progress is limited in two 
ways. First, not all selection pressures count as threats, and there is no reason to focus specifically on 
those selection pressures that do. Second, while they (along with Cottrell and Nueberg (2005)) 
recognize the relevance of cultural evolution in principle, their account never actually appeals to any 
cultural selection histories. Accordingly, the next section will use the sociofunctional theory as a 
stalking horse, a foil against which to compare and contrast our preferred approach.  
 
IV. Etiological Functionalism at Work: Adding Motivations of Approach 
 
Cottrell and Neuberg’s (2005) “sociofunctional, threat-based approach” puts etiological 
functionalism to work in the study of prejudice. In their own terms (2005, p. 771), “…individuals 
possess psychological mechanisms ‘designed’ by biological and cultural evolution to take advantage 
of the opportunities provided by group living and to protect themselves from threats to group 
 
5 Recent research has also found intriguing relationships between aspects of disgust and political attitudes; see Aarøe et 
al. 2020 and Ruisch et al. 2020. 
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living.” Schaller and Neuberg (2012) then integrate the behavioral immune system into this 
framework, identifying  
a set of qualitatively distinct prejudices rooted in distinct sets of psychological processes, 
each of which can be understood as an adaptive consequence to a distinct kind of threat that 
imposed evolutionary selection pressures on ancestral populations. Within this broad 
framework, individual lines of research have focused on two specific kinds of threat—the 
threat of interpersonal violence and the threat of infectious disease—and their separate 
implications for different kinds of prejudices pertaining to different categories of people” (p. 
4).  
Even if these authors never use the terms “etiology” or “functionalism,” they employ these 
principles adeptly, allowing Cottrell and Neuberg to give penetrating analyses of several other 
theories of prejudice, including two of those mentioned above. Regarding the Stereotype Content 
Model, they correctly point out (p. 775) that a four-way classification scheme identifying admiration, 
envy, pity and contempt is both too coarse-grained and too narrow in scope. For example, they 
object that contempt lumps together anger and disgust, each of which evolved in response to a 
different adaptive threat, and each of which drives different forms of prejudicial behavior. They also 
object that the Stereotype Content Model fails to address the role of fear in outgroup avoidance, 
since fear is not a common response to either the warmth or the competence of a foreign group. 
Cottrell and Neuberg then criticize Intergroup Emotions Theory on similar grounds of scope. Its 
authors, they argue, “have limited their explorations to the emotions of anger and fear, within the 
context of having experimental participants imagine interacting with groups designed to differ in the 
strength of threat they posed to participant in-groups” (p. 775). Thus, they claim the theory is ill-
equipped to account for the role of disgust and other components of the behavioral immune system. 
These specific critiques highlight the more general problems we raised above. Despite the 
important insights yielded by more local theories, they ultimately provide a patchwork of narrowly 
focused and difficult to integrate fragments, leaving possible gaps in our knowledge of the general  
domain, and no clear way of identifying where the holes lie. That such shortcomings are clarified by 
evolutionary theory also illustrates the potential of etiological functionalism for making headway on 
this problem. Yet the sociofunctional account fails to fully realize this potential. As noted above, 
nothing in evolutionary theory suggests that selection is only about avoiding threats. Some adaptive 
pressures are indeed rooted in threat, resulting in motivations of avoidance such as fear or disgust. But 
contrasting with these are motivations of approach (see Elliot 2006), many of which evolved to ensure 
that animals take advantage of various adaptive benefits, rather than avoid threats. Ancestors who 
were better able to acquire food, water, high-quality mates, and other goods had higher fitness, 
leading to the evolution of approach-based motives like hunger, thirst, and sexual attraction.6 
 
6 In some cases, of course, a lack of beneficial resources could be called a threat, so hunger could be interpreted as the 
avoidance of starvation, and thirst as the avoidance of dehydration. But it stretches the meaning of “threat” to say that a 
person with a kitchen full of food is facing threat of starvation when his hunger drives him downstairs for a snack. 
Similarly, when a person who already has five children feels sexual attraction, it isn’t clear what adaptive threat is being 
avoided, and yet clearly the motivation to reproduce is still doing exactly what it was selected for. More generally, we are 
skeptical that the entire category of approach-based motives needs to be, or could usefully be, reinterpreted in terms of 
adaptive threats, understood as the lack of adaptive benefits or any other form of “threat”. 
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More to the point, motivations of approach are likely to play a significant role in the 
psychology of group membership, and can lead to consequences that are negative for outgroups. An 
unfair hiring decision, for example, can just as easily result from the members of the hiring 
committee being favorably disposed towards an ingroup applicant as from their being averse toward 
outgroup applicants. Indeed, there is reason to think that such positive, approach-based motivations 
can take multiple forms as well. A recent analysis (Moya and Boyd 2015) identified two distinct 
pressures selecting for two distinct forms of affiliation, one that is operative in the context of 
coordination, the other in the context of cooperation.7 Neither pressure, however, would select for 
motivations of avoidance toward outgroup members. Rather, in cases of coordination and 
cooperation alike, humans will be more motivated to approach ingroup members than outgroup 
members. This is still compatible with the possibility of individuals also approaching outgroup 
members, rather than avoiding them. Attempting to work with foreigners or unknown outsiders can 
be a more promising option than not working with anyone at all, and thus foregoing even the 
possibility of benefits from social interaction. 
Therefore, Moya and Boyd also apply the principles of etiological functionalism when they 
appeal to distinct selection pressures to identify distinct forms of motivation. However, unlike 
Cottrell, Neuberg, and Schaller, they focus on selection pressures beyond those that take the form of 
threats. This focus allows them to recognize approach-based, affliative motivations that lead to 
ingroup favoritism. We will return to this in our penultimate section. 
 
V. Gene-Culture Coevolution, Norms, and Tribal Social Instincts: Adding 
Normative Motivations 
 
In addition to using etiological functionalism to include approach-based motivations within a 
more comprehensive and integrated picture of group psychology, Moya and Boyd’s discussion also 
broadens the picture along another dimension, which will be our focus in this section. More 
specifically, it gives an example of how to incorporate culture, cultural evolution, and cultural selection 
into the picture, and illustrates the benefits of doing so. 
 
7 In their own words: 
“There are a number of reasons why people may be motivated to assort with others from the same social 
category. First, people may be ethnocentric so they can avoid coordination costs by interacting with others who 
share their same preferences, expectations, or personality characteristics (McElreath et al. 2003). Alternately, 
people may be motivated to interact with others from the same group for cooperative endeavors, knowing they 
will have recourse to group-based punitive institutions were their partner to defect (Bowles and Gintis 2004; 
Boyd and Richerson 1992). The former interactions, which are pure coordination games, differ from the latter, 
cooperative ones in that there is no incentive to defect on one’s partner. However, behavioral patterns of 
assortment may reflect motivations for coordination, cooperation, or both, and without direct interventions it 
is nearly impossible to distinguish between them. Therefore, we discuss in-group preferences that may arise 
from either selection pressure jointly. (Moya and Boyd 2015, p. 15) 
Note that while “coordination costs” might sound like a reference to an adaptive threat, the term captures the fact that 
interactions with outgroup partners are merely less effective at producing adaptive benefits. Being less beneficial is not 
the same as being a threat or a harm, however, and neither of the two pressures described by Moya and Boyd would 
would select for motivations of avoidance toward outgroup members. 
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In cooperative endeavors, they note, a preference for ingroup partners is adaptive because 
the interactants “have recourse to group-based punitive institutions were their partner to defect” 
(2015). This claim is supported by a large body of work arguing that culturally inherited 
institutions—taken to include norms, laws, and policies—will be favored by selection when they 
effectively suppress free riding and defection in cooperative interactions (Boyd & Richerson 2009; 
Chudek & Henrich 2011; Henrich 2004). This research is based on dual inheritance theory, whose 
central idea is that individual humans inherit traits both genetically, through reproduction, and 
culturally, through social learning. 
Each of these two streams of inheritance gives rise to its own form of selection and fitness. 
Thus, to say that cultural traits are selected is not to say that they spread by increasing the genetic 
fitness of individuals. Quite the contrary, in some cases cultural traits may spread even while reducing 
the genetic fitness of individuals who adopt them (consider norms of celibacy, or the recent spread 
of the anti-natalist movement c.f. Brown and Keefer 2020; Richerson and Boyd 2005, Chapter 5). 
Rather, the claim is that groups in which rules against cheating and free riding are enforced are more 
capable of collectively generating nonexcludable public goods, such as military defense and public 
infrastructure. As a result, more cooperative groups grow faster and outcompete less cooperative 
groups, enabling their culturally inherited traits to spread more widely through the overall human 
population—including their norms against cheating and free riding. In technical terms, dual 
inheritance theorists hold that cultural group selection has favored the evolution of cultural traits that 
promote large-scale, prosocial cooperation (Richerson et al. 2016). 
These two streams of inheritance interact with each other as well, making it important to 
distinguish between cultural and genetic selection pressures. For the sake of clarity, we will call those 
adaptive pressures that act on genes “genetic selection pressures” regardless of the “source” of those 
selection pressures, and so regardless of whether they are generated by the physical, biological, 
social, or cultural features of the environment. Correspondingly, we will call those adaptive pressures 
that act on culture and cultural items “cultural selection pressures,” regardless of the source of those 
pressures. 
To illustrate, Moya and Boyd claim that preferring ingroup partners to outgroup partners is 
genetically adaptive for individuals, because it leads to more adaptive benefits from cooperation. 
Individuals from the same group will share a common set of norms, and know they will likely be 
subject to punishment if they violate those norms. By contrast, potential cooperative partners from 
different groups will not be bound by each other’s norms, making cheating and free riding easier and 
more likely, thus reducing the likely benefits of cooperating with outgroup members. As a result, the 
genetic fitness payoffs of cooperation with outgroup members are, on average, lower than the 
fitness payoffs of cooperation with ingroup members. The “source” of these differential selection 
pressures acting on genes, however, is a social environment filled with prosocial norms and 
institutions. And these norms and institutions consist of traits that individuals inherit culturally, 
through social learning. Thus, the genetic selection pressures Moya and Boyd refer to are generated 
by culturally transmitted norms, and would only have been operative after the relevant cultural traits 
evolved and spread. This is an instance of what dual inheritance theorists call culture-driven genetic 
selection (Henrich 2016), or gene-culture coevolution (Richerson and Boyd, 2005). 
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As a result, the affiliative motivations Moya and Boyd identify are hypothesized to contribute 
to a set of distinctively human “tribal social instincts” (Richerson and Boyd 2001; Richerson and 
Henrich 2012; also see Kelly 2013). These genetic adaptations (“instincts”) evolved in response to 
selection pressures generated by a culturally evolved social environment characterized by large-scale 
(“tribal”) cooperation, in groups of a few hundred to a few thousand people.8 This coevolutionary 
dynamic results in a positive feedback loop favoring cooperation. The more cultural selection 
pressures favor reliance on culturally local norms, the stronger the genetic selection pressures 
become favoring tribal instincts for internalizing norms and for motivating individuals to comply 
with and enforce them. But at the same time, genetic adaptations for norm internalization also 
render cooperative norms more effective at producing cooperative behavior, thereby giving cultures in 
which such norms are common further selective advantages over competing cultures. 
This coevolutionary dynamic has wide-ranging implications for human social psychology, 
but for present purposes, the most important ones concerns the capacity to internalize norms. 
Individuals who internalize the norms of their culture become intrinsically motivated to follow them 
(Sripada and Stich 2007; Chudek and Henrich 2011; Kelly and Davis 2018). To follow a norm out of 
intrinsic motivation is to “do the right thing” (as specified by the norm) for its own sake, regardless 
of the consequences of the action, or the instrumental value of obtaining approval or avoiding 
punishment. Moreover, there is reason to think that when a norm is internalized, individuals thereby 
acquire intrinsic motivations to enforce the norm as well, sanctioning others who fail to comply.9 
This is striking, since from a functional point of view obeying a norm oneself is quite distinct from 
punishing those whose break it (see Boyd 2017 for discussion). 
Gene-culture coevolution appears indispensable in accounting for internalization and 
intrinsic normative motivations (Gavrilets and Richerson 2017), a fact which lends credence to the 
idea that these features of human norm psychology are distinct from the psychological 
underpinnings of other types of social and rule-governed behavior (also see Kelly 2020, 
forthcoming). For example, a person can act in accordance with a rule simply out of fear of being 
punished. From a psychological point of view, this is not the intrinsic motivation associated with 
internalized norms, but rather a merely instrumental form of motivation. Indeed, the relevant 
motivational element here would be ordinary fear, rather than concerns about doing the right thing 
or being a good person. This kind of fear of punishment is just an instance of fear of aggression 
from conspecifics, an avoidance-based motivational capacity that, as noted above, has a selection 
history that is shared with other species and that originates much further back in our phylogeny than 
the emergence of culture and cultural norms. The same can be said of approach-based instrumental 
motives to follow norms in order to obtain social approval and increased status. Genetic selection 
 
8 In their own words, “Cultural evolution created cooperative groups. Such environments favoured the evolution of a 
suite of new social instincts suited to life in such groups, including a psychology which ‘expects’ life to be structured by 
moral norms, and that is designed to learn and internalize such norms. New emotions evolved, like shame and guilt, 
which increase the chance the norms are followed. Individuals lacking the new social instincts more often violated 
prevailing norms and experienced adverse selection. They might have suffered ostracism, been denied the benefits of 
public goods, or lost points in the mating game.” (Boyd and Richerson 2009, p. 3286) 
9 As Sripada and Stich put it (2007, p. 289), “children who learn that hitting babies is wrong do not need to be taught 
that one should exhibit anger, hostility, and other punitive attitudes toward those who hit babies.” Also see Kelly and 
Setman 2020 for discussion and review of recent evidence, especially from developmental psychology. 
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pressures favoring motivations for seeking status were already in place in our primate lineage well 
before emergence of human-like levels of culture.10 
By contrast, only after the emergence and proliferation of culturally inherited norms would a 
distinct “instinct” to follow and enforce rules have enhanced genetic fitness, and only then would 
genetic selection favor intrinsic normative motivations to do the right thing for its own sake. In a 
social environment filled with norms, it is simply too risky, and too cognitively demanding, to try to 
make instrumental calculations about all of the rules one needs to be sensitive to at a given time 
(Gintis 2003; Sperber and Baumard 2012). But reliable enforcement of norms only became a 
common feature of the human social environment within roughly the last one million years, 
emerging along with the hypertrophied social learning capacities that make us cultural creatures in 
general (Boyd and Richerson 2009). Thus, on this picture, while the genetic evolution of cultural 
learning capacities is a necessary condition for the cultural evolution of norms, the cultural evolution 
of norms is likewise a necessary condition for the genetic evolution of capacities dedicated to norm 
internalization. In the early days of norm evolution, all motivations for following and enforcing 
norms were merely instrumental. Only after thousands of years of the cycle of gene-culture 
coevolution would more fully evolved tribal social instincts have emerged and spread, complete with 
intrinsic normative motivations.  
 
VI. Etiological Functionalism at Work: Righteous Anger, Righteous Disgust, and 
Other Culturally Inflected Emotional Molecules 
 
These details about cultural evolution are relevant to the psychology of intergroup 
interactions in a number of ways. For just as individuals may exhibit more or less negativity toward 
outgroups, so, too, may whole cultures.11 A cultural group’s level of xenophobia, ethnocentrism, or 
other form of outgroup negativity will be a function of their shared cultural values, expressed in, for 
instance, norms that license withholding fair and equal treatment to members of other races, and 
shared belief-like states such as negative racial stereotypes, oppressive scripts, and prejudicial 
schemas. As noted above, the precultural, genetic selection pressures that Neuberg et al. identify 
explain why outgroup members are easy targets for ancient motives like fear, disgust, and anger. 
Against this psychological background, it is all too easy for hostile and avoidant norms to spread 
through cultural transmission, and the more common such norms become, the more likely it is that 
they will be internalized by more members of the group.12 As a result, many members of such a 
 
10 We should note that in humans, status appears to take two functionally distinct forms: dominance, which has a deep 
evolutionary history and is found in other species, and prestige, which is culture based and unique to us (Henrich and 
Gil-White 2001, Cheng et al 2012). We acknowledge this complication, and its implication that there may be at least two 
distinct types of emotional molecules related to hierarchy in the human psychology of group membership, but set it 
aside for development in later work. 
11 Also see Davidson (2019) for a pluralist account of racism that appears extendable to other notions associated with 
outgroup negativity, like xenophobia, prejudice, bigotry, etc. According to Davidson, all kinds of different entities can 
properly be called racist, including individual people, beliefs, motivations, actions, norms, laws, cultural groups, 
institutions, etc. Furthermore, on her account no one of those types of entities is more basically or primarily racist than 
any of the others. 
12 See Buskell (2017) for a discussion of how such precultural cognitive mechanisms can serve as “cultural attractors” 
that boost the fitness of cultural variants, Nichols (2002) for evidence of a specific case involving culturally transmitted 
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group will not just experience fear, anger, or disgust toward outgroups. They will also view those 
feelings as justified, such that outgroup negativity is not just common, it is also seen as right.  
As a result, culturally inherited norms that prescribe outgroup negativity give rise to at least 
three distinct sources of motivation. First, individuals might be instrumentally motivated to follow 
such norms, in order to avoid reprimand from and to gain the approval of their ingroup fellows. 
Here, norms that are culturally inherited can leverage more general motivational capacities that 
predate culture itself, such as desire for status and fear of punishment by ingroup members. Second, 
to the extent that individuals internalize such norms, they will also become intrinsically motivated to 
obey them. They will thus be be disposed to treat outgroup members poorly because they see it as 
the right thing do, and will be so motivated independently of any desire for social rewards or fear of 
potential punishment. Third, on the hypothesis that the process of norm internalization bundles 
intrinsic motivations of enforcement together with intrinsic motivations of compliance, individuals who 
internalize negative outgroup norms will also be intrinsically motivated to punish other members of 
their own group who violate such norms, and to reward those who follow them.  
Thus, one way in which norm psychology interactions with emotion is by providing the 
cognitive elements for certain emotional molecules. For example, the intrinsic motivation to punish 
someone for violating a norm may combine representations of wrongness, or transgression, with the 
emotional core of anger. We will call this emotional molecule righteous anger (c.f. Rozin et al 1999, 
Cherry and Flanagan 2018), to distinguish it from other emotional molecules in the anger genre, 
which fall within the same genre in virtue of sharing the core motivational element of an aggressive, 
approach-based impulse to attack. For example, another emotional molecule in this genre produces 
the “fight” part of the “flight-or-fight” response. Evolution has selected for what can be called 
defensive anger: an hostile, aggressive response to situations in which an animal believes it is cornered 
and flight is not an option. Similar aggressive behavior is adaptive in other contexts as well, including 
those that involve competition for resources. The competitive anger that motivates individuals to fight 
over food scraps is thus yet another distinct molecule in this emotional genre. Righteous anger, then, 
is a norm-specific subtype of anger.  The selection pressures that gave rise to it evolved long after 
those that gave rise to defensive or competitive anger, because they arose only after the relatively 
recent evolution of human culture in general.    
Consider, as a simplified example, the violent aggression of white segregationists toward civil 
rights activists participating in lunch-counter sit-ins during the 1960s in the United States. The 
attackers obviously were not defending themselves, since the activists rigorously adhered to a 
strategy of passivism. Competition for proximate resources was not at issue, either. White patrons 
were not concerned that if lunch counters began serving African-Americans, they would run out of 
food or seating for white customers. Instead, the conflict centered around the culture of segregation.13 
The attackers had grown up in the Jim Crow South, internalizing norms according to which 
segregation is right, and integration wrong. The civil rights activists were deliberately and flagrantly 
violating these norms, so righteous anger was a lamentable but preditable response.  
 
norms and the emotion of disgust, and Buchanan and Powell (2018) for a compatible but much broader picture 
concerning disgust, “threat cues”, and the spread of “exclusivist” norms and values. 
13 Or, in Wilkerson’s (2020) provocative terminology, the conflict was about the American caste system. 
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Of course, cultural evolution has also produced norms against outgroup negativity, 
(“inclusivist” norms in Buchanan and Powell’s (2018) terminology, “impartial” norms in Henrich’s 
(2020)). Indeed, the widespread internalization of such norms is a key element in explaining many 
instances of moral progress, such as the successes of the civil rights movement. Those who fought 
for it were quite aware of the violent anger they would face, even given their peaceful method of 
passive resistance. This naturally triggered fear of punishment, an instrumental motivation to comply 
with segregationist norms, rather than flout them. Nevertheless, the protesters persisted. As strong 
as their fears must have been, other motives were stronger still. Fear was suppressed and overridden 
by powerful and countervailing motivations derived from internalized norms of justice and equality. 
Accordingly, both the segregationists and the activists were likely acting from intrinsic normative 
motivations associated with the norms they acquired from their respective cultures. The difference 
was that they came from very different cultures, with clashing sets of norms. 
A similar account can be given for righteous disgust.14 Just as representations of norm 
violations can activate the motivational core of anger, they can also activate that of disgust (Haidt et 
al. 1993; Rozin et al. 1999; Nichols 2004; Kelly 2011; Graham et al. 2013). Righteous disgust should 
thus be distinguished from the direct pathogen disgust that is trigged by outgroup members, as the 
shared motivational element of disgust is paired with different cognitive elements in each case. 
While direct pathogen disgust is activated by the classification of individuals as members of foreign 
groups who may carry dangerous pathogens, righteous disgust is activated by representations of 
norm-violating behaviors. As noted above, Schaller and Neuberg’s (2012) discussion of the 
behavioral immune system provides an excellent account of direct pathogen disgust, but it fails to 
address righteous disgust. Both emotional molecules can contribute to poor treatment of outgroup 
members, but will do so in different ways. 
 
VII. (The Beginnings of) A Taxonomy of the Psychology of Group Membership 
 
In this section we compile and integrate many of the points we have made along the way, 
recasting them in our own terms. We are hopeful that the taxonomic structure we offer will be able 
to accommodate and situate more local accounts of different aspects of the psychology of group 
membership. The recipe for fitting in other emotional molecules will remain the same as the one 
used here: first identify the relevant motivational capacities, by appeal to selection history, then 
identify the various cognitive elements that are paired with that motivational core, again by appeal to 
selection history. Following this recipe, we enumerate eleven distinct molecules that contribute to 
outgroup negativity and ingroup favoritism, which are simply the ones that we have had the 




14 Something similar often gets called “moral disgust” (Chapman and Anderson 2013, Kelly 2013, Plakias 2018). We 
avoid that label here and in our above discussion of anger (i.e see Russell and Giner-Sorolla 2011) to signal that not all 
internalized norms need be moral norms, and disgust (or anger, or any other emotion) can be activated by a norm 
transgression whether or not that norm counts as moral (Davis and Kelly 2018, Stich 2018). 
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The phrase “hostile emotion” may most naturally be associated with anger. As noted above, 
there are many emotional molecules in this genre, many different cognitive elements that can 
combine with anger’s powerful motivational core. Morever, it seems to us that all of the anger-based 
emotions identified above may be directed toward outgroups under certain conditions.  
Chimpanzees and hunter-gatherer humans alike tend to be territorial and aggressive toward 
trespassers (Schaller and Neuberg 2012, p. 17), and recorded human history is full of instances of 
raiding and conquest. Thus, both (1) competitive anger and (2) defensive anger toward outgroups would 
have been adaptive throughout much of our evolutionary past. Competitive anger toward outgroup 
members helps obtain important resources, often by securing territory, while defensive anger helps 
when one’s group is under attack from outsiders trying to seize its resources. The existence of 
group-level conflict among chimpanzees suggests that the associated selection pressures were already 
acting upon the genetically inherited traits of individuals before the evolution of human culture. 
However, raids and conquests are the kinds of collective activities made more effective by cultural 
norms, so an environment regulated by norms may have further augmented the genetic selection 
pressures already in place.  
By contrast, (3) righteous anger would only have come into existence after evolution equipped 
humans with tribal social instincts and the capacity to internalize norms, since these provide the 
cognitive elements of this emotional molecule. Righteous anger directed at outgroup members will 
not be triggered in virtue of their being recognized as outgroup members, but in virtue of their 
norm-violating behaviors. However, since outsiders will typically not have internalized the local set 




Unlike anger, fear leads to avoidance, but the two share similarly long and complex 
etiologies. Like anger, fear was selected to help deal with adaptive threats, some of which took the 
form of aggression from outgroup members. The presence of intergroup conflict and aggression 
among chimpanzees suggests that selection pressures favoring (4) direct fear of outgroup members 
existed well before culture became a major factor in human evolution. But as with competitive anger 
and defensive anger, the effects of culture would likely have further augmented these selection 
pressures.  
Direct fear can then be distinguished from (5) fear of sanction along a number of dimensions. 
Most obviously, direct fear is triggered by outgroup members, while fear of sanction is triggered by 
the possibility of disapproval from members of one’s own group, and the punishment they are likely to 
administer if they catch you violating a local norm. In this latter case, the motivational core of fear is 
channeled into instrumental behaviors of norm compliance, rather than intrinsic normative 
motivations. For example, in the Jim Crow South, a white woman who was too friendly with black 
men could have suffered significant damage to her reputation, affecting her status, marriage 
opportunities, etc. The psychological state of someone motivated by fear of sanction from her white 
counterparts is very different from the psychological state of someone intrinsically motivated by 
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norms of segregation. It is also very different from the psychological state of someone motivated by 
fear of black men. But in a culture containing racist norms, both subtypes of fear can be prevalent, 




We are in broad agreement with the idea that genetic selection would have favored (6) direct 
pathogen disgust toward outgroup members. This emotion is a key component of the behavioral 
immune system, some ancestral version of which probably evolved long before gene-culture 
coevolution became a dominant force in human evolution. We also agree with Schaller and 
Neuberg’s (2012, 36) claim that “outsiders are often ignorant of local behavioral norms that serve as 
barriers to pathogen transmission (e.g., norms pertaining to hygiene, food- preparation); as a 
consequence, they may be more likely to violate these norms, thereby increasing the risk of pathogen 
transmission within the local population”. Thus, even before culture or norms were on the scene,  
disgust was already driving negative behavior and attitudes toward outgroups, and there is reason to 
think that cultural evolution’s influence on inter- and intra-group dynamics would have reinforced 
the selection pressures that had already forged the function of this emotion.  
However, there is again a distinction to be made between direct pathogen disgust and the (7) 
righteous disgust that is triggered by norm violations. The latter is likely to have a shallower selection 
history than the former, since righteous disgust would only have been adaptive after gene-culture 
coevolution gave rise to tribal social instincts and norm internalization. Of course, righteous disgust 
only takes on an ethnocentric or xenophobic flavor when the transgressor of the norm is an 
outgroup member. But norm violations committed by foreigners and outsiders are not likely to be 
rare. Schaller and Neuberg’s point about outsiders being unfamiliar with local hygiene norms actually 
applies to all local norms. That unfamiliarity will lead to a wide range of transgressions, many of 
them inadvertent. Nevertheless, the righteous disgust triggered by an outsider’s norm violation is a 
different emotional molecule from the direct pathogen disgust triggered by indications of 
membership in a foreign group, observable as “phenotypic abnormalities” in clothing styles, 




Cooperation and coordination are fundamental features of human life. They generate crucial 
benefits, and both genetic and cultural selection pressures favor capacities to successfully engage in 
both kinds of social interaction (Henrich and Muthukrishna 2021). At the core of these capacities 
are approach-based motivations of affiliation, which cause individuals to seek out, team up with, and 
bond with others. Individuals need to be discerning about whom they interact with, however, so 
selection also favors cognitive capacities for assortment, which function to evaluate potential 
partners, and affiliative motivations toward those partners most likely to secure the adaptive benefits 
of each form of interaction. In coordination, a poor choice of partner renders the enterprise less 
effective for both partners; the benefits of working together are not worth the costs from either 
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party’s perspective. In cooperation, a poor choice of partner is comparatively worse. An 
indiscriminate cooperator can be exploited by partners who defect and take a disproportionate share 
of the benefits. In each case, both genetic and cultural selective pressures have favored cognitive 
capacities for identifying and keeping track of potential partners, as well as motivations of affiliation 
toward the more promising ones.  
Here again we see a motivational core, which we’ll just call affiliation, that can be paired with 
distinct cognitive elements to form distinct molecules of the same emotional genre.15 The distinct 
social dynamics associated with cooperation and coordination, respectively, would have generated 
distinct adaptive challenges, resulting in cognitive elements with distinct functions that could shape 
the inputs and outputs to affiliation in different ways. Thus, we add (8) coordination affiliation and (9) 
cooperative affiliation to our taxonomy. 
Coordination affiliation will be sensitive to a potential partner’s language, internalized norms, 
customs, and practical goals, since social interactions with a partner who shares these characteristics 
are likely to be more effectively coordinated; styles will align and things are apt to go smoothly. 
Ethnic boundary markers and other easily perceivable features of appearance, like skin color, will 
also be salient, since they are relatively reliable correlates of the basic similarities just listed. Even 
within the same group, coordination affiliation is likely to be directed toward friends, acquaintances, 
business partners, and employees who are perceived to be more similar to oneself in these ways. But 
between groups this effect is amplified considerably, since these are exactly the sorts of traits that 
people from different groups tend not to share. Language, values, customs, practical goals and 
clothing styles are all culturally inherited traits that tend to diverge, through a combination of 
selection and drift, as cultural evolution takes its own course in separate societies. Thus, 
coordination affiliation tends to result in favoritism and preferential treatment toward ingroup 
members over outgroup members (also see Efferson et al. 2008). 
Cooperation affiliation, by contrast, will be sensitive to information that indicates a potential 
partner is likely to resist temptations to cheat, free ride upon, or otherwise exploit you. This includes 
memories of one’s track record of past interactions with a partner, as well as knowledge about the 
partner’s reputation as a cooperator in general. It also includes information about what norms and 
values they are subject to, and may have internalized. In addition to reciprocity and reputation, 
another primary reason why people refrain from exploiting other ingroup members in the pursuit of 
one’s own self-interest is that in most cultures doing so is considered wrong.16 Moya and Boyd’s 
(2015) reasoning illuminates this: since norm enforcement is more effective at maintaining prosocial 
behavior within a given group than across group boundaries, cooperating with ingroup members is 
the safer choice. Of course, unknown outsiders may have internalized the specific cooperative 
norms of their own culture, and evidence that they are motivated to behave cooperatively could 
 
15 There may not be any clear single term for affiliation in the vernacular (“attachment”? “love”? “admiration”? 
“fondness”? “concern”? “loyalty”? “team spirit”? “patriotism”?) or at least not as clear of a single correlate as in the 
cases of disgust, fear, and anger. As noted in Section II, however, our etiological functionalism and molecular view of 
emotions is free to depart from folk conceptions of emotions. We see this as feature of our approach rather than a bug. 
(Also see Mallon and Stich 2000 on the semantics of thin and thick ways of slicing emotions.) 
16 From a broad evolutionary and historical view this is likely true, even if it may be false of many cultures today. As 
Marx notoriously pointed out, exploiting others in the pursuit of self-interest may be the very heart of capitalist culture; 
thanks to Uwe Peters for reminding us of this. 
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increase their desirability as cooperative partners. Nevertheless, it is typically more difficult to glean 
such evidence about outgroup members than about one’s fellow ingroup members. This makes 
ingroup members not just the safer choice but the easier one, and it certainly makes them more 
likely to activate the affiliative motivation that pushes one cooperate. Thus, both the cooperative and 





Our discussions of righteous anger (3) and righteous disgust (7) above distinguished these 
emotions from other forms of anger and disgust. What makes these forms of anger and disgust 
“righteous” is their functional connection to the cognition of right and wrong; in each case, the 
motivational core characteristic of the emotional genre is paired with tribal social instincts and an 
internalized norm. However, both emotions occur in the context of norm enforcement, in response to 
the norm-violating behavior of others. By contrast, (10) intrinsic normative motivations can drive one’s 
own compliance with internalized norms. Those who have internalized norms that prescribe various 
forms of outgroup negativity or ingroup favoristism will be directly, non-instrumentally, motivated 
to engage in such behaviors (e.g., using water fountains reserved for white people), for no other 
reason than they understand this behavior as right.18 
 As noted in Section VII, intrinsic normative motivations are distinct from (11) instrumental 
motivations of all sorts, including instrumental motivations to follow or enforce norms. Yet again, as 
long as the norms themselves prescribe outgroup negativity or ingroup favoritism, instrumental 
motivations to follow these norms can produce such behavior. The class of motivations that drive 
instrumental norm compliance is likely to be heterogenous, since incentives take the form of both 
sticks and carrots; individuals can instrumentally comply with a norm in order to avoid a sanction, 
but also to gain a reward. Indeed, we have already named one type of avoidance-based motivation 
that can drive instrumentally normative behavior, namely, fear of sanction. But other instances of 
instrumentally motivated norm compliance can be driven by approach-based motivations (status-
seeking, affiliation, etc.), rather than fear.19 
 
17 In the same spirit as the points made in footnotes 10 and 15, we again acknowledge a complication only to set it aside 
for future work. For there are likely many further emotional molecules in this genre, including those that pair affiliative 
motivation with the distinct assortative capacities associated with different forms of sociality and cognitive wherewithal, 
including but not limited to: familial love, genetic relatedness, and kin-related selection pressures; romantic love, mate 
choice, and child rearing-related selection pressures; friendship, camaraderie, and reciprocity-related selection pressures; 
the positive associative feelings that accompany the kind of interdependence found in social networks large enough that 
not everyone interacts on a regular basis, but small enough that members need to be able to keep track of everyone’s 
reputations and interconnections; and team spirit, group pride, patriotism, and forms of positive emotional investment 
associated with differently structured cultural groups and and larger communities, both real and imagined. 
18 While we follow a trend (e.g. Henrich and Ensminger 2016) in describing some psychological motivations as 
“intrinsic”, it is not trivial to spell out what the term means, perhaps other than serving as a contrast class for 
“instrumental”; see Kelly 2020 for discussion on this and the connection between normative motivations, emotions, and 
other psychological sources of motivation. 
19 In many situations, of course, the same norms will elicit both intrinsic and instrumental motivations at the same time. 
But in other cases, one might follow a xenophobic norm specifically in order to gain approval or seek status. Governor 





In sum, then, our initial taxonomy of emotions that contribute to outgroup negativity and 
ingroup favoritism contains three forms of anger (competitive, defensive, and righteous), two forms 
of fear (direct fear of outgroup members, fear of sanction), two forms of disgust (direct pathogen 
disgust toward outgroup members, righteous disgust), two forms of affiliation (coordination, 
cooperation), and two ways of being motivated by cultural norms (intrinsic, instrumental). We have 
been careful to note that this is neither the end—there are many more emotional molecules to 
distinguish, study, and incorporate into the framework—nor the beginning, as we take ourselves to 
be building on and synthesizing important work previously done by others. 
In addition to the strengths we have explicitly touted, we will end by noting two more. First, 
a theoretical one. We hope to have illustrated the power of an evolutionary framework, and 
particularly dual inheritance theory, to organize and illuminate work across the human and 
behavioral sciences (also see Richerson and Boyd 2005, especially chapter 7; Muthukrishna and 
Henrich 2019). Second, a more practical one. Different instances of outgroup negativity and ingroup 
favoritism—nepotism, cronyism, ethnocentrism, partiality, discrimination, prejudice, intolerance, 
bigotry, racism, xenophobia, dehumanization—are almost certainly underpinned by different 
psychological mechanisms, with those differences giving rise to different social dynamics. It is also 
unlikely there will be a single, one-size-fits-all strategy that will effectively ameliorate every form. 
Getting clear on the functional character of the various mechanisms and dynamics, and the 
similarities and differences they bear to each other, is a crucial step in designing interventions and 
policies more finely tuned to better address each particular type. We hope to have contributed to 
this project as well, even if less directly. 
  
 
University of Alabama, which clearly served to garner approval from segregationist voters. He very well might have 
thought he was doing the right thing as well, in which case it would be an example where intrinsic and instrumental 
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